We model the role of a parliament's structure in shaping the accountability of elected representatives. In a setting in which lawmakers interact with a lobby through a bargaining process and with voters by means of elections, we show that only a single legislative body who can make take it or leave it offers to the lobby can be held unambiguously accountable to voters. Whenever the pressure group enjoys some bargaining power, two chambers might instead provide better discipline, depending on the rules governing their interaction, and in particular the allocation of the decision powers among them. We show that bicameralism with restricted amendment rights provides the best incentives, while unrestricted amendment rights result in a status quo bias. Furthermore, by adding complexity of the legislative process, the presence of a second chamber might lead to an undesirable outcome, i.e. a decline in the legislator's bargaining power visà vis the lobby and a reduction in his accountability. Arguments suggesting that bicameralism is a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators should therefore be taken with due caution.
Introduction
In modern democracies members of legislative bodies are appointed through popular elections and while in principle parliaments should only serve the interests of the electorate, in practice elected legislators are often subject to other pressures. In particular, organized interest groups commonly offer elected officials money or information in exchange for policy favors.
How does lobbying affect policy choice? According to a benevolent view, pressure groups convey information on individual preferences, thereby enhancing public decision making.
From a more critical perspective, lobbies and citizens might well have conflicting interests and as a consequence of lobby pressures, the legislature might no longer maximize the well being of the citizenry. When electoral accountability is at risk, it is natural to ask how citizens can provide incentives to legislators to serve their interests. In other words, how is it possible to increase electoral discipline? The design of political institutions plays a very important role in shaping a government's behavior and might help to prevent the abuse of power by legislators. In this paper we focus on bicameralism, an institutional arrangement common to many democratic countries, 1 and investigate whether the existence of a second legislative body can increase the accountability of elected representatives. In federal countries like the United States, Germany or Canada the existence of two chambers in the Parliament is motivated by the need to represent the interests of the sub-national entities in a separate second body but more generally, the concern for a potential abuse of power provides a very important justification for bicameralism. This intent has been highlighted by Madison (1788) 
2 "It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient."
1 Half of the OECD countries have two chambers. See Testa (2003a) . 2 The Federalist paper 62. While Madison's argument has clear, intuitive appeal, the existing empirical evidence does not point out a systematic relationship between the number of chambers in a Parliament and the extent of accountability 3 . To solve this puzzle, we develop what is to the best of our knowledge the first model that combines the analysis of legislative procedures, lobbying and elections. We show that the design of the legislative branch affects the power of electoral incentives (voting) vs. monetary incentives (lobbying) , and analyze which rules can increase electoral discipline. As it turns out, when a single legislator and a lobby bargain over the rents generated by the policy, only if the legislator can make take-it-or-leave-it offers, he can always be held accountable to the voters. If his bargaining power is instead limited, there is scope for introducing a second legislative body to promote electoral discipline. The effect of increasing the number of chambers that need to sequentially approve the implementation of a project differs depending on the distribution of powers between them. In particular, we show that for accountability purposes, the best bicameral system is that in which equal decision powers are given to the two chambers. The system that attributes final decision power to the second chamber is instead bad for incentives, since it may generate a status quo bias. The system assigning more decision power to the first legislator can instead be ranked between the two previous alternatives. Our analysis also highlights a potential shortcoming of the longer decision-making process associated with multiple legislators, i.e. the possibility that the legislators might lose bargaining power because there is not enough time to engage in negotiations with the lobby. For these reasons, our model provides a useful framework to evaluate the consequences of constitutional reforms altering the powers of legislative bodies, like the ones being planned in Germany, the UK and Italy 4 and suggest an important caveat, i.e. that when multiple chambers do not retain the same power to make counter-offers as a single one, bicameralism might reduce accountability.
The framework developed in this paper is closely related to the agency model of political competition (among recent contributions see Banks and Sundaram (1998) , Coate and Morris (1995) and Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997) ) since we study how an elected legislator can adopt choices enhancing his utility at the expense of the voters' welfare. However, we depart from the standard agency models in several directions. First, instead of a representative agent, we consider voters and legislators with heterogenous preferences for policies. Hence, rather than bad or good politicians, we have elected lawmakers that can take advantage of their position to enhance their private utility, or refrain to do so because they are interested in winning elections and continue to choose their most preferred policy. Second, we assume that lobbying is the source of the agency problem by explicitly modelling the role of pressure groups. In this sense, our model is related to the literature on public decision making in presence of lobbying and elections (in particular see Grossman and Helpman (1996) , Besley and Coate (2001) ). However, more fundamentally, and differently from this literature, we ask whether legislative procedures can affect the balance of power between lobbies and voters. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , Groseclose and Snyder (1996) , Diermeier and Myerson (1999) and Cardona-Coll and Mancera (2000) , among others, consider simultaneously lobbying and legislative procedures. However, research considering the interaction between elections, lobbying and legislation is scant, 5 and by combining these three dimensions, our paper builds a bridge between several streams of existing literature. In doing so, we gain a number of new and important insights on the role of institutions in balancing the interests of voters, who can only interact with legislators by means of periodic elections, and the interests of a minority of agents (lobbies), which can instead use more refined instruments, like monetary transfers, to continuously influence legislators during the law making process.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and discusses the main assumptions. In section 3 we characterize the equilibrium under unicameralism, while section 4 deals with bicameralism and accountability under both an open rule and a closed rule setting. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
The model
Consider an economy composed of a set {1, ..., K} of citizens indexed by k. To keep the analysis simple, we model the interaction between electors e, legislators g and lobbies l as a game lasting for two periods 6 t ∈ {1, 2}, with δ being the discount factor between the two periods. We start by considering the case of a single legislator. The task of the legislator 5 One of the few examples is represented by Denzau and Munger (1986) , who study the relationship between voters, lobbies and legislators in a reduced-form model that does not provide micro-foundation for the agents behavior.
6 In the rest of the paper we will interchange the terms period and mandate.
is the selection of a public project on the behalf of all citizens k. The lobby l and the electors e, interacting with the legislator g, can influence his project choice. The timing of the game between g, l and e is as follows. A citizen g, exogenously appointed to become the first legislator, initiates the legislative process to select a public project in t = 1. Once the process has been initiated, but before the actual policy choice, the lobby l can "bribe" the lawmaker to affect his decision. At the end of the first period, citizens observe the implemented project and decide whether to reappoint the incumbent or replace him. At the beginning of the second period, the elected legislator initiates a new process and the lobby l can again bribe him. A project is then chosen and the game ends. The public project chosen in each period is characterized by two dimensions: cost C and type a. The total cost C is shared by all citizens, who end up paying the a capita cost
of the policy is an attribute on which individuals have different preferences. As in the citizen-candidate framework (Besley and Coate (1997) , Osborne and Slivinski (1996) ) we assume that legislators are policy motivated on the type dimension, i.e. they cannot commit to a policy type different from their most preferred one.
We denote by a g the policy type delivered by legislator g and a kg the direct benefit arising to In the next two sections we consider more in detail the lobbying and the voting stages.
Lobbying
We model the lobbying activity in each period t as a bargaining game of alternating offers between the lobby and the incumbent legislator. We suppose that during each political mandate t, negotiation rounds r take place, with r = {1, ..., n}, where one player proposes a project and a share of the corresponding rent to the other player, who can either accept or reject. If no agreement is reached by the end of the mandate t, given that the legislator can implement any policy independently of the lobby, the disagreement payoffs will be determined by the policy unilaterally chosen by the legislator.
As it seems natural, we assume that the lobby initiates the game by making the first proposal.
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If the proposal is accepted, the bargaining ends with an agreement, while if the proposal is rejected, the bargaining goes to the next round. In each of the rounds r > 1 a player is randomly assigned the right to make offers. To describe the structure of the game, we illustrate a portion of the extensive form in Figure 1 , where N is nature. Let q and (1 − q) respectively be the probability that policy maker g and lobby group l make a proposal at each round r > 1. Both probabilities are common knowledge among the parties and the extreme cases where q = 0 or q = 1 represent the situations in which the lobby or the legislator can make take-it-or-leave-it offers, i.e. one of the parties enjoys all the bargaining power. The assumption of random proposers is made to capture the link between the bargaining power of the legislator and the lobby's ability to influence policies.
Formally, we can describe the bargaining game taking place in stage t as follows. Denoting Throughout the paper we will focus on the situation in which citizens e and the lobby l have opposite interests on the policy, i.e.
We are now ready to introduce the voting stage.
Voting
For simplicity we assume that there are only two candidates, A and B, drawn from the set of citizens distributed according to their preferences for the policy types a. We denote by m the median voter of this distribution 8 and we assume that the two candidates are respectively located to the left and right of the median voter, i.e. they have different preferences for the policy type. Our main objective here is to understand whether the threat of a political rival with different policy preferences can discipline the incumbent in his current policy choice.
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Candidate A is exogenously selected to become the first legislator and at the end of the first period his reappointment is challenged by B. We assume that the candidate receiving the vote of the median voter wins the elections. The median voter decides whether to reappoint the incumbent A or to replace him with challenger B, after having observed the policy choice
. A strategy for the median voter e = m consists then in a mapping σ m :
where σ m = 1 means that policy maker A will be reelected by the median voter and σ m = 0 indicates instead that the median voter will support the challenger B. To avoid the trivial case in which one candidate always wins the elections because he has an absolute advantage in the political race, we assume that if both candidates choose the same cost C, there is no a A and a B such that one candidate wins the election. In other words, none of them can win the election on ideological grounds. In the context of our model, voting is deterministic, and for 8 Remember that citizens can be ranked according to their preferences for the policy types because preferences are single peaked.
9 In other words, we investigate whether non convergence to the median voter has implications for accountability. Although in this paper we do not endogenize the location, there is a vast literature showing the existence of non-convergence equilibria. Among the recent contributions, see Testa (2003a) and Fauli'-Oller, Ok, and Ortuno-Ortin (2003) . no candidate to have an advantage on ideological grounds, both must have an equal chance to win the election, i.e. they must be equally distant from the median voter. More formally, denoting by | a kg − a gg | agent's k utility loss when g ∈ {A, B} chooses the policy, we assume that | a mA − a mm |=| a mB − a mm |. As a result, the political issue that can make a difference is the cost of the project, which becomes the "politically salient" characteristic as in Besley and Coate (2003) 
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. Notice that, even if this is the case, the multi-dimensionality continues to play an important role. In fact, given that candidates are policy-motivated on the policy type, they do care about re-election as a mean to achieve their most preferred outcome and this will affect in a non-trivial way the incentives provided by voters to legislators.
Given the voting decision σ m , the intertemporal utility of individual k, denoted by V k , with k ∈ {A, m, l}, is defined as follows
Assuming that the median voter m casts optimally his ballot, given the strategies adopted by the lobby l and the policy maker g, we define the equilibrium of the voting game as follows
11
:
Definition 1 The equilibrium of the voting game is a voting rule σ
With the further requirement that the strategies played in the bargaining game in each period t satisfy subgame perfection, we are now ready to define the political equilibrium:
10 Alternatively, for both candidates to have a chance of winning when the electorate votes on ideological grounds, we could assume a probabilistic voting setting, where both parties always have a chance to win the elections. Hence one might wonder about the generality of the analysis carried on under alternative voting assumptions. Since the crucial assumption driving the results is the political salience of the non-ideological dimension, it should be clear that the deterministic or probabilistic voting are merely technical assumptions. To simplify the voting side of the model, we decided to adopt the deterministic voting framework.
11 The median voter chooses a voting rule that maximizes his total utility V m (., σ), given his expectation about the legislator's behavior, as in Ferejohn (1986) . Furthermore, the voting rule must be sub-game perfect, i.e. we consider only rewards/punishments that can be credibly carried on once the first period policy has been chosen. Hence, this voting rule is consistent with both retrospective and prospective voting. 
A unicameral system
Under which conditions can a single legislator be made accountable to the electorate? We start to analyze this problem characterizing the share of rents that induces him to choose the high or the low cost project. Clearly, in the two mandates, the sharing rules that implement a high cost project will be different because the legislator faces elections at the end of the first mandate only. In the second period, given a share β 
will induce him to choose the high cost project and the equilibrium shares will depend on the bargaining power of the players, i.e. on their right to make offers. In the first period, the threat of loosing elections might induce the legislator to be accountable to voters. If he chooses a low cost project, he can expect to be rewarded by voters, while if he chooses a high cost project he can be punished by the electorate and replaced by a challenger. As it is shown in the appendix, it turns out that in equilibrium the legislator is reelected if he has chosen the low cost project or if he has decided not to carry out any project, while he is not reelected if he has chosen the high cost project.
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Given 12 The intuition for this result is as follows. In the last period the incumbent's behavior does not depend on the voting rule because the game ends and he cannot be punished or rewarded by the voters. Hence, the best reply for the median voter is a strategy that induces the legislator to choose the voter's preferred policy at least in the first period. This strategy punishes the incumbent if he chooses the worse policy for voters, p 1 A,C H and rewards him if he doesn't. Note that this strategy satisfies subgame perfection since it makes the median voter weakly better off at any time, i.e. before and after the first period policy has been chosen. We can also show that a perturbation of the electoral outcome induced for example by the presence of noise voters will not alter the equilibrium as long as the fraction of noise voters in the population is not too large. These arguments are formally established in the appendix. Proof. In t = 2,when r = n, any proposer can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer and extract the entire profit. Legislator g makes a take-it-or leave it offer with probability q, while the lobby does the same with probability 1 − q, and given that v
When r = n − 1, each player is willing to accept a transfer that is at least equal to what they could achieve in round n by rejecting in round n − 1.
Hence, again each player would propose x 
, we obtain that if β
A is offered, the incumbent A prefers the policy p Hence, electoral accountability is at risk only when qπ ≥ C H . For this reason, in the rest of the paper we will assume that this restriction holds. Regarding the first period bargaining, the critical share β 1 A depends on the taxes C H the legislator pays in the first mandate, the share of profits q he receives in the second mandate if he is reelected, and on the distance between his most preferred policy type and the policy type implemented by legislator B if he is in power, (a AA − a AB ). In other words, the legislator is willing to choose the high cost project and not be reelected, if the share of the rents net of taxes he receives in the first mandate compensates him for the electoral loss consisting in giving up future lobby transfers and not being able to choose his most preferred policy type.
Turning now to the lobby, since as any other citizen she has preferences for policy types, she will not be indifferent to the change of legislator following the implementation of the high cost policy in the first mandate. The following lemma provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for the lobby to prefer the high cost policy in the first period, implying a change of incumbency:
We are now ready to characterize the policy choice in the first mandate in the following
Proof. Lemma 2 establishes that β A . Hence, all we need to show is that the lobby will obtain at least a share β
and states the feasibility of the minimum shares inducing the legislator and the lobby to agree on p 1 A,C H . The shares depend on the legislator preferences for the project type, and on the bargaining power of the players. It is straightforward to verify that if the legislator has the power to make a take-it-or-leave it offer, i.e. if q = 1, and the future is not discounted (δ = 1) the minimum share inducing the incumbent to choose the high cost project is not feasible.
Therefore, when the legislator has all the bargaining power, he will be accountable to voters.
This result is summarized in
Corollary 1 Suppose that δ = 1. When the legislator makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, the
Proof. If the legislator has the power to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer and δ = 1,then he requires β
> 1, which is not feasible.
The opposite case, in which the lobby can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer (q = 0), represents the worst case for accountability as the minimum share implementing the high cost policy reaches the lowest value when q = 0. Note also that the polarization of the political race has a positive effect on accountability. In fact, if the race is very polarized the difference (a AA − a AB ) is large and as a result the feasibility of the minimum share implementing p 1 A,C H will become less likely.
Bicameralism
An important advantage of modelling the interaction between the lobby and the parliament as a bargaining game of alternating offers is that by using this approach we can explicitly lay out the institutional setup of a sequential legislative process where, at each stage, legislators are allowed to take different actions, like vetoing or amending a proposal previously approved. In this section we will explore how how alternative institutional rules (i.e.
bargaining protocols) can affect electoral accountability.
Intuitively, introducing multiple legislators makes lobbying more costly, since more decision makers need to be compensated for the implementation of an unpopular policy. At the same time, introducing additional steps in the legislative process is likely to increase the time span needed for the policy to be adopted, with the result of making it potentially difficult to reach an agreement before the end of the mandate. Another less obvious implication of having multiple legislators is that their ability to make counteroffers to the lobby might be considerably reduced because of the limited time available to complete negotiations. Hence, a complex legislative structure, besides rendering it more difficult to implement new policies can also increase the ability of the pressure group to influence the decision making process, and make the accountability problem more severe. In what follows we will show how these forces play out under two different institutional arrangements commonly adopted in democracies, i.e. a closed rule and an open rule system. In the former, after the first legislator has proposed a policy the other chambers only enjoy veto power. In the latter, all legislators are symmetric in the sense of being able to introduce amendments to the original proposal. We will carry out the discussion in a general environment with multiple legislators and will then analyze more in detail the bicameral system, which is the most commonly used arrangement. Before proceeding we need to adapt our notation to accommodate the more complex structure of the game.
To that end, suppose that the legislative process involves the sequential approval of 
) and the set of feasible agreements between g d +1 and l is given by X
under closed rule and X
≥ 0} under open rule. Figure 2 illustrates the structure of the game under open rule.
For simplicity, we rule out the possibility of divided government in our model, assuming that all legislators belong to the same party and therefore the direct benefit from the policy a g arising to legislator g d can be normalized to a gg .
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The one period payoff to the various agents are analogous to those reported in equations 1 -4, just replacing equations 3 and 4
13 Although in most bicameral systems the two chambers have the same type of majority, divided chambers are not uncommon for example in the US Congress. In a companion paper (Testa, 2004) 
We are now ready to define the political equilibrium. For the voting game, we can use the previous definition
14
. Concerning the lobbying, we now have a sequence of bargaining games between l and g d within each mandate t . Hence, for subgame perfection to hold, in t = 2 we must require that that the strategies played by l and g d in the game starting in r are subgame perfect given not only any strategy played by l and g d in their future rounds of negotiation, but also given any strategies played by l and successive legislators g d+1 in every subsequent bargaining game taking place within the same mandate. In t = 1, on the other hand, we must take into account not only the strategies played in every future round within that period, but also the voting strategy played by the median voter at the and of the first period and the strategies played in every bargaining game between l and g d in t = 2.
Formally, we require the following :
14 The only difference here is that the median voter chooses a voting strategy maximizing V m (.) given a more complex strategy profile (γ 
Closed rule
The proposal power of the players in the bargaining game depends on their ability to make counter-offers. In particular, by making a take-it-or-leave-it offer, the last proposer can capture the entire rent. So far we have assumed that independently of the legislative process, the lobby can make the last proposal with probability (1 − q). However, the length of the legislative process is likely to have an important impact on the right of the legislators to make counter-offers. In particular, by increasing the number of chambers in the Parliament, the minimum number of negotiation rounds necessary to give multiple legislators the same proposal power of a single legislator increases. This result is summarized in the next 
Proof. In t = 2 the following holds. For n = D + k, the first legislator g d has the power to make at least one counter-offer with probability q. In the absence of lobby transfers 
, vetoing is not credible. As a consequence, if the lobby can induce the first legislator to choose p 2 g,C H , then she does not need to pay any positive transfer to convince g d with d > 1 to pass p 2 g,C H . We can now determine the equilibrium transfers inducing the first legislator to choose p 2 g,C H . Let r be the last round of negotiation between g 1 and l. Knowing that the two players can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer respectively with probability q and 1 − q, g 1 receives qπ and l receives (1 − q)π. Moving to round r − 1, the minimum payment that g 1 is willing to accept is qπ and similarly for l it will be (1 − q)π. The same is true moving backward until r = 1, when the lobby l offers x 
, where β
Hence, when
> 1 can credibly threat to veto the proposal passed by g 1 , unless they receive β and therefore β
Note that legislators enjoying only veto power cannot extract any rent in the last mandate, while the legislator with proposal power is able to extract some rents (T
long as the number of available rounds is sufficient for him to make at least one counter-offer with some probability. An example will help us to illustrate the link between the number of legislators and their ability to make counter-offers. Consider the case of a bicameral system, where D = 2. In that context, the minimum number of negotiation rounds needed for a chamber to be able to make at least one counter-offer with probability q is n = 3. If there were at most two feasible rounds of negotiations, the two legislators would not be able to make counter-offers, because a rejection by one chamber would trigger the termination of the process, since the remaining number of rounds is not sufficient for the policy proposal to be approved.
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Among the situations that could give rise to this outcome, complex negotiations in coalitional governments, lengthy parliamentary procedures 
Since the lobby initiates the bargaining by making the first proposal, if the number of available rounds is not sufficient for the legislators to make counter offers, the lobby enjoys a first mover advantage. Of course, if the power to initiate the bargaining was randomly assigned, then the number of rounds will not affect the power to make counteroffers since the lobby and the legislator will both be first movers with some probability.
16 The recent and much talked about use of the filibuster in the US senate to block the nomination of judge Estrada to the DC appeals court is just one example. See "Waiting for Godot" in The Economist November 13, 2003.
17 We focus on the cost of lobbying associated with the electoral loss of multiple legislators because we are mainly interested in electoral incentives. However it should be clear that having multiple chambers deciding sequentially rather than simultaneously can have a substantial impact on the lobby's ability to bribe the legislator whenever lobbying is a costly, time consuming activity or the rents emerging from an agreement decrease with time. Hence, our results on the positive effect of bicameralism on accountability hold a fortiori if we introduce either a cost of lobbying or a profit that are time dependent. the presence of multiple legislators has a negative impact on accountability. Interestingly, the proposition shows a non-linear relationship between accountability and the number of legislators that is illustrated in figure 3 , where It is therefore interesting to explore whether bicameralism possesses the appealing feature of improving accountability, when the second chamber has only veto power. To keep the characterization of the policy choice as simple as possible, from now on we will assume that the lobby always prefers the high cost to the low cost policy, i.e. that lemma 2 holds for every bargaining share. Notice also that if
< 0, an increase in the number of legislators does not affect accountability. For this reason, in the remainder of the paper, we will make the following:
Let β 
with respectively two and one legislator. First note that 
Open rule
When amendment rights are ruled out, the power to choose the content of the new legislation is given entirely to the chamber initiating the process and the following legislators can only decide whether to approve or not the initial proposal. If amendment rights are instead introduced, the following legislators can actually modify the original policy. Since the first chamber will anticipate this possibility, the existence of amendment rights is likely to have an important effect, and to analyze it we concentrate for simplicity on the case where all D legislators have the possibility to make at least one counter-offer (i.e. n ≥ 2D). We consider both the case of unrestricted amendment rights, i.e. the situation in which the policy passed by the previous chamber can unilaterally be modified by the subsequent legislators, and the situation in which the amendments introduced require the approval of all legislators (restricted amendment rights). In both cases, chambers d > 1 can only amend a legislative proposal passed by the first chamber, or in other words, they do not have the power to initiate the legislative process.
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If no legislation is passed in the first chamber, then the mandate ends with the no policy outcome.
Since in the second term the policy p 2 g,C H is always implemented, we focus on the first period policy choice.
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Let β
be the minimum payment that each legislator g d is willing to accept in order to implement p 
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that in case sub ii) of theorem 2 under unrestricted amendment rights the status quo (p To complete our discussion of bicameralism and accountability, we would like to briefly consider another example in which bicameralism is neutral. Suppose that for a given economic environment, the policy preferred by the lobby is the status quo, while the voters prefer instead a different policy. In this case, with a bicameral system, voters need the approval of two legislative bodies to see the implementation of their preferred policy, while the lobby will be satisfied just by the negative decision of one chamber. It is then clear that the existence of a second legislator does not have any effect since the cost of lobbying does not change compared to the one chamber case. In other words, policy choices implemented by negative decisions are "cheaper" to buy than policy choices requiring a positive decision.
Therefore, if the lobby supports the status quo, increasing the number of legislators does not help solving the accountability problem.
Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a theoretical framework to analyze the effects of legislative arrangements on the lawmakers' accountability to the public. In particular, inspired by the thoughts of the founding fathers of modern democracies, we have considered how the organization of the legislative power, i.e. the number of chambers in a parliament and the allocation of powers among them, can discipline elected representatives and limit the ability of pressure groups to buy influence. To that end, we have built a model in which legislators interact with a lobby group through a bargaining process and with voters by means of elections.
The main result of our analysis is that the relationship between legislative arrangements and accountability depends in a fundamental way on the structure of the bargaining game.
By considering different protocols we have shown that only when a single legislator has the power to make a take-it-or-leave it offer to the lobby, he will be unambiguously accountable to voters. Whenever the lobby enjoys some bargaining power, two chambers may instead help to increase accountability. As it turns out, the effectiveness of a bicameral system crucially depends on the rules governing the functioning of the two elected bodies, and in particular on the allocation of the decision power between the chambers. For accountability purposes the best incentives are provided whenever two legislative bodies share equal decision powers (i.e. restricted amendment rights). Having instead unrestricted amendment rights can result in a status quo bias, whereby no new legislation is passed. Another intriguing result emerging from our analysis is that the increased complexity of the legislative process induced by an additional chamber may come with an undesirable effect, i.e. the loss of bargaining power for the elected body visà vis the lobby. When the legislative process becomes longer, more rounds are necessary to approve a proposal. Given that a policy needs to be agreed upon by the end of the mandate, legislators may not have the time to engage in the negotiation with the lobby in order to extract some rents. As a consequence, the lobby retains the power to make take-it-or-leave-it offers. When this happens, bicameralism might well have a detrimental effect on accountability. Hence, our analysis suggests that bicameralism should not be considered a panacea against the abuse of power, and that instead any institutional reform aimed at increasing the accountability of elected legislators should pay close attention to the distribution of powers between the parliament's chambers.
Another important result of our model is that legislator's accountability is also related to the characteristics of the political race, since the polarization in party position enhances electoral discipline. The polarization result is robust to the alternative specifications of the bargaining game and the degree of polarization necessary to keep the legislator accountable is increasing in the bargaining power of the lobby group. As for further work, we can think of at least two ways to extend our analysis. First, we have assumed the polarization of the political race as exogenously given, but the relationship between polarization in society and polarization in the political race remains an important open question that requires further investigation. 
Proof. Since the voting decision depends only on the policy outcome, the same argument is not an equilibrium strategy. Consider next the following alternative strategy
Under the voting rule σ 2 m the incumbent is never reappointed. Therefore, since p 1 A,C H generates a higher net profit to be shared, 
Note that under this voting strategy a legislator is not re-elected if he chooses the status quo. As v 
Since the previous voting strategies will not be played in equilibrium, then from the
A,C L ) the same is true for:
Noise voters
In this section we consider the effect of introducing noise voters, i.e. voters who respond to non-policy relevant features of the candidates, and show that the median voter continues to be able to discipline the legislator(s) in the first period. To that end, let γ . From the symmetry of the distribution it is immediately clear that
where P rob(η ≥ η) can be interpreted as the probability that the median voter is able to successfully reward legislator A, while P rob(η ≥ η) represents the probability that he will be unsuccessful in punishing legislator A. The conditions necessary for the median voter to be able to discipline legislator A in the first period are then summarized in the following Lemma 6 Let η be the fraction of noise voters. In the first period, legislator A prefers policy
Proof. Notice that with noise voters, 
Proof of Theorem 2
The following lemma characterizes the second period equilibrium agreement and the minimum profit shares required to implement the high cost policy in the first period under restricted and unrestricted amendment rights:
Lemma 7 We are now ready to prove theorem 2.
Proof. When R = 1 given that p ] > 1, but that each individual transfer is less than the profit, δq + C H +δ(a AA −a AB ) π < 1. In this case, the first legislator could choose p 1 g,C H if he is offered the appropriate transfer. However, given that legislators d > 1 cannot all be offered the transfer necessary to pass p 1 g,C H , the lobby will not find it optimal to carry out the transfer necessary to obtain p 1 g 1 ,C H in the first legislative step, knowing that this proposal will be overridden by some of the subsequent legislators. As a consequence, the lobby offers (p then g 1 chooses p 1 0 since by assumption 1 δ ≥δ .
